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Abstract. As has been widely discussed, the GSM mobile telephony
system only offers unilateral authentication of the mobile phone to the
network; this limitation permits a range of attacks. While adding sup-
port for mutual authentication would be highly beneficial, changing the
way GSM serving networks operate is not practical. This paper proposes
a novel modification to the relationship between a Subscriber Identity
Module (SIM) and its home network which allows mutual authentication
without changing any of the existing mobile infrastructure, including the
phones; the only necessary changes are to the authentication centres and
the SIMs. This enhancement, which could be deployed piecemeal in a
completely transparent way, not only addresses a number of serious vul-
nerabilities in GSM but is also the first proposal for enhancing GSM
authentication that could be deployed without modifying any of the ex-
isting network infrastructure.
Keywords: GSM, mutual authentication, SIM application toolkit, RAND
1 Introduction
This paper proposes a way of adding network-to-phone authentication to the
GSM mobile phone system, in a way that is completely transparent to the exist-
ing network infrastructure. Currently, GSM only supports authentication of the
phone to the network, leaving the system open to a wide range of threats (see,
for example, [21]). Despite the introduction and deployment of 3G (UMTS) and
4G (LTE) mobile phone systems, which rectify the GSM problem by providing
mutual authentication between phone and network, GSM remains of huge prac-
tical importance worldwide and is not likely to be replaced for many decades to
come. As a result, finding ways of improving the security offered by GSM, with-
out the need for changes to the deployed phones and access networks, is clearly
of great practical significance. This observation motivates the work described in
this paper.
It is somewhat counterintuitive to propose that authentication of the network
to the phone can be achieved without modifying the way in which the existing
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network and phones operate. This apparently paradoxical result is achieved by
using a technique we refer to as RAND hijacking. This involves using the RAND
value, which serves as a nonce in the existing unilateral authentication protocol
and is sent from the network to the phone, to contain data which enables the
recipient SIM to verify its origin and freshness. That is, the RAND is hijacked
to act as a communications channel between a home network and a SIM.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Key facts about the GSM
network, including details of the operation of the GSM authentication and key
establishment (AKA) protocol, are given in Sect. 2. This is followed in Sect. 3 by
an introduction to the notion of RAND hijacking. In Sect. 4, the novel enhanced
version of the GSM authentication scheme is described, and Sect. 5 describes how
the SIM can use the results of the network authentication to affect UE behaviour.
An analysis of the novel system is provided in Sect. 6. The relationship of the
proposed scheme to the prior art is discussed in Sect. 7, and the paper concludes
in Sect. 8.
2 GSM
2.1 Terminology
We start by providing a brief overview of key terminology for mobile systems.
We focus in particular on the GSM network, but much of the description applies
in slightly modified form to 3G and 4G networks. A more detailed description
of GSM security features can, for example, be found in Pagliusi [22].
A complete mobile phone is referred to as a user equipment (UE), where the
term encapsulates not only the mobile equipment (ME), i.e. the phone, but also
the subscriber identity module (SIM) within it, where the SIM takes the form of
a cut-down smart card. The SIM embodies the relationship between the human
user and the issuing home network, including the International Mobile Subscriber
Identity (IMSI), the telephone number of the UE, and other user (subscriber)
data, together with a secret key shared with the issuing network which forms
the basis for all the air interface security features.
To attach to a mobile network, a UE connects via its radio interface to a
radio tower. Several radio towers are controlled by a single radio network con-
troller (RNC) which is connected to one mobile switching center/visitor location
register (MSC/VLR). The MSC/VLR is responsible for controlling call setup
and routing. Each MSC/VLR is also connected to the carrier network’s home
location register (HLR) where corresponding subscriber details can be found.
The HLR is associated with an authentication center (AuC) that stores crypto-
graphic credentials required for communicating with the SIM; specifically, the
AuC shares a unique secret key Ki with each SIM issued by the network to
which it belongs. The RNC and the MSC/VLR are part of the visiting/serving
network whereas the HLR and the AuC are the home network component.
2.2 GSM Authentication Protocol
To prevent unauthorised mobile devices gaining access to network service, GSM
incorporates an authentication procedure which enables the network to verify
that the SIM in a UE is genuine. The authentication procedure operates as
follows. Further details can be found in technical specifications GSM 03.20 [10]
and GSM 04.08 [12].
1. The UE visits a network, and is initially identified using its IMSI.
2. The visited network identifies the UE’s home network from the supplied
IMSI, and contacts the home network for authentication information.
3. The home network’s AuC generates one or more authentication triples (RAND,
XRES, Kc), and sends them to the visited network, where RAND is a 128-
bit random ‘challenge’ value, XRES is the 64-bit ‘expected response’, and
Kc is a 64-bit short-term session key to be used to encrypt data sent across
the air interface between the UE and the network.
4. The visited network sends RAND to the UE as an authentication challenge.
5. The ME receives the RAND, and passes it to the SIM.
6. The SIM computes SRES = A3Ki(RAND) and Kc = A8Ki(RAND), where
A3 and A8 are network-specific cryptographic functions; A3 is a MAC func-
tion and A8 is a key derivation function. Note that precisely the same com-
putation was performed by the AuC in step 3 to generate XRES and Kc.
7. The SIM passes SRES and Kc to the ME.
8. The ME keeps the session key Kc for use in data encryption, and forwards
SRES to the serving network.
9. The serving network compares SRES with XRES ; if they are the same the
UE is deemed authenticated, and Kc can now be used for traffic encryption
using any of the standardised algorithms (i.e. one of A5/1, A5/2 and A5/3),
as selected by the serving network.
2.3 Vulnerabilities
The GSM AKA protocol clearly only provides one-way authentication. As widely
documented (see, for example, [21]), this permits a ‘false’ base station to imper-
sonate a genuine network and interact with a UE. This in turn gives rise to a
range of security weaknesses. We are particularly interested in attacks of the
following types.
– Because the network always decides whether or not to enable encryption,
it is possible for a malicious party to act as an intermediary between a UE
and a genuine network, impersonating the network to the UE and using a
genuine SIM of its own to talk to the network. All traffic sent via the man-in-
the-middle is simply relayed. The false network does not enable encryption
on the link to the UE, so the fact that it does not know the encryption key
does not matter. If the genuine network chooses to enable encryption, then
the man-in-the-middle can communicate with it successfully since it is using
its own SIM for this leg of the communications. As a result, the man-in-
the-middle can seamlessly listen to all the voice traffic sent to and from the
victim UE, at the cost of paying for the call.
– The fact that the network decides whether or not to enable data encryption
also enables the well known Barkan-Biham-Keller attack, [2]. This attack
is designed to recover the encryption key Kc, and hence enable unlimited
interception of phone calls. The attack takes advantage of three key facts:
A5/2 is very weak, the network decides which algorithm to use, and the same
key Kc is used with all three encryption algorithms. One possible scenario
for the attack is as follows.
Suppose an eavesdropper intercepts the AKA exchange between the network
and a UE (notably including the RAND), and also some of the subsequent
encrypted voice exchanges involving that UE. Suppose also that the UE
is subsequently switched on within the range of a fake network operated
by the attacker. The fake network inaugurates the AKA protocol with the
UE, and sends the previously intercepted RAND , causing the SIM in the
UE to generate the same Kc as was used to encrypt the intercepted data.
The UE responds with SRES (which the fake network ignores) and the fake
network now enables encryption using A5/2. The UE will now send data to
the network encrypted using A5/2 with the key Kc; because of certain details
of the GSM protocol, the plaintext data will contain predictable redundancy.
The fake network now takes advantage of the weakness of A5/2 to recover
Kc from the combination of the ciphertext and known redundancy in the
corresponding plaintext. The key Kc can now be used to decrypt all the
previously intercepted data, which may have been encrypted using a strong
algorithm such as A5/3.
The lack of mutual authentication has been addressed in 3G and later net-
works. As a result it is tempting to suggest that trying to fix GSM is no longer
of relevance. However, GSM continues to be very widely used worldwide and
will continue to be for many years to come; so finding ways of upgrading GSM
post-deployment appears to be worthwhile. However, any such solution must
work with the existing infrastructure, i.e. the existing serving network systems.
We are therefore interested in a solution which only requires SIMs and the home
network to be upgraded. Such a solution can be rolled out piecemeal with no im-
pact on the existing global infrastructure, and this is the focus of the remainder
of this paper.
2.4 Proactive SIM
Before proceeding we need to briefly review a key piece of GSM technology which
enables the SIM to send an instruction to the ME. Proactive SIM is a service
operating across the SIM-ME interface that provides a mechanism for a SIM to
initiate an action to be taken by the ME. It forms part of the SIM application
toolkit (STK), which was introduced in the GSM 11.14 technical specification
[11]. Communications between an ME and a SIM are command/response based,
and STK provides a set of commands which allow the SIM to interact and
operate with any ME which supports them.
The GSM technical specification [13] states that the ME must communicate
with the SIM using either the T=0 or T=1 protocol, specified in ISO/IEC 7816-3
[16]. In both cases the ME is always the master and thus initiates commands to
the SIM; as a result there is no mechanism for the SIM to initiate communica-
tions with the ME. This limits the possibility of introducing new SIM features
requiring the support of the ME, as the ME needs to know in advance what ac-
tions it should take. The proactive SIM service provides a mechanism that allows
the SIM to indicate to the ME, using a response to an ME-issued command, that
it has some information to send. The SIM achieves this by including a special
status byte (‘91’ followed by the length of the instruction to send) in the response
application protocol data unit. The ME is then required to issue the FETCH
command to find out what the information is [14]. The ME must now execute the
SIM-initiated command and return the result in the TERMINAL RESPONSE
command. To avoid cross-phase compatibility problems, this service is only per-
mitted to be used between a SIM and an ME that support the STK commands.
The fact that an ME supports specific STK commands is revealed when it sends
the TERMINAL PROFILE command during SIM initialisation.
The SIM can make a variety of requests using the proactive SIM service.
Examples include: requesting the ME to display SIM-provided text, initiating
the establishment of on demand channels, and providing local information from
the ME to the SIM. The commands of interest here are GET CHANNEL STA-
TUS, which requests the ME to return the current status of all available data
channel(s), and CLOSE CHANNEL, which requests the ME to close the speci-
fied data channel. Both of these STK commands are marked as ‘class e’, which
means that an ME that supports ‘class e’ STK commands is capable of executing
both commands of interest [9]. Although support of STK is optional for an ME,
if an ME claims compliance with a specific GSM release then it is mandatory
for the ME to support all functions of that release. Since 1998 almost all of the
mobile phones produced have been STK enabled, and today every phone on the
market supports STK [1].
3 RAND Hijacking
We use the term RAND hijacking to refer to the idea of using the RAND, sent
from the network to the UE during AKA, as a way of conveying information
from the AuC to the SIM. That is, instead of generating the RAND at random,
it is generated to contain certain information; this information is typically sent in
encrypted form so that to an eavesdropper it is indistinguishable from a random
value.
This idea was apparently first described in a patent due to Dupre´ [6]. How-
ever, the use Dupre´ makes of the idea is rather different to that proposed here.
Later, Vodafone introduced the concept of a special RAND [23] in 3GPP TSG
document S3-030463. As for Dupre´, the purpose of the special RAND was com-
pletely different to that proposed here. The other published references to the
notion appear in papers [4, 5, 18] that independently propose the use of RAND
hijacking for improving the privacy properties of GSM, 3G and 4G networks. As
far as the authors are aware, no previous authors have proposed the use of this
technique for providing mutual authentication in GSM networks.
4 Server-to-SIM Authentication
We now propose a way of using RAND hijacking to enable authentication of
the network to the SIM. For this to operate the SIM must be programmed
to support the scheme, as well as possess certain (modest) additional data, as
detailed below. The AuC of the network issuing the ‘special’ SIM must also store
certain additional data items for each such SIM, and must generate its RAND
values in a special way for such SIMs. No other changes to existing systems are
required. It is important to note that the system could be deployed gradually,
e.g. by including the additional functionality in all newly issued SIMs, whilst
existing SIMs continue to function as at present.
4.1 Prerequisites
In addition to sharing Ki, A3 and A8 (as required for executing the standard
GSM AKA protocol), the SIM and AuC must both be equipped with the fol-
lowing information and functions:
– functions f1 and f5, where f1 is a MAC function and f5 is a cipher mask
generation function, both capable of generating a 64-bit output;
– a secret key Ka to be used with functions f1 and f5 which should be distinct
from Ki — to minimise memory requirements, Ka and Ki could, for example,
both be derived from a single SIM-specific master key;
– a 48-bit counter to be used to generate and verify sequence numbers1.
The functions could be precisely the same as their counterparts used in 3G
(UMTS). Indeed, the function names and string lengths have deliberately been
made identical to those used in 3G systems to make implementation and migra-
tion as simple as possible.
4.2 Protocol Operation
The novel AKA protocol only differs from the ‘standard’ GSM AKA protocol
(as described in section 2.2 above) in steps 3 and 6. Thus, since these steps
only involve the AuC and SIM, it should be clear that the scheme is inherently
transparent to the serving network and the ME. We describe below how these
steps are changed.
1 As in 3G, an AuC might choose to manage a single counter shared by all user
accounts (see, for example, [20]).
Fig. 1. Modifications at the the AuC
4.3 Revised Steps
Step 3 is changed to the following step 3*. To generate a new authentication
triple, the AuC proceeds as follows (see Fig. 1, in which the dotted block repre-
sents the usual operation of the AuC).
3.1 The AuC uses its counter value to generate a 48-bit sequence number SQN,
which must be greater than any previously generated value for this user
account.
3.2 A 16-bit value AMF is also generated, which could be set to all zeros, or
could be used for purposes analogous to the AMF value for 3G networks.
3.3 A 64-bit tag value MAC is generated using function f1, where
MAC = f1Ka(AMF||SQN),
and, as throughout, || denotes concatenation of data items.
3.4 A 64-bit encrypting mask AK is generated using function f5, where
AK = f5Ka(MAC).
3.5 The 128-bit RAND is computed as
RAND = ((AMF||SQN)⊕AK)||MAC,
where, as throughout, ⊕ denotes the bitwise exclusive or operation.
3.6 The XRES and Kc values are computed in the standard way, that is XRES
= A3Ki(RAND) and Kc = A8Ki(RAND).
Step 6 is changed to step 6*, as follows (see Fig. 2, in which the dotted block
represents the usual operation of the SIM).
Fig. 2. Modifications at the SIM
6.1 On receipt of the 128-bit RAND value, the SIM first splits it into two 64-bit
strings X and MAC*, where X||MAC* = RAND.
6.2 A 64-bit decrypting mask AK* is generated using function f5, where
AK* = f5Ka(MAC*).
6.3 A 16-bit string AMF* and a 48-bit string SQN* are computed as:
AMF*||SQN* = X ⊕AK*.
6.4 A 64-bit tag XMAC is computed as:
XMAC = f1Ka(AMF*||SQN*).
6.5 The recovered sequence number SQN* is compared with the SIM’s stored
counter value and XMAC is compared with MAC*:
– if SQN* is greater than the current counter value and XMAC = MAC*,
then:
• the network is deemed to be successfully authenticated;
• the SIM’s counter value is updated to equal SQN*; and
• SRES and Kc are computed as specified in the current step 6;
– if either of the above checks fail then:
• network authentication is deemed to have failed;
• the SIM’s counter value is unchanged; and
• SRES and Kc are set to random values.
It should be clear that, in step 6*, AK*, AMF*, MAC* and SQN* should
respectively equal the AK, AMF, MAC and SQN values originally computed by
the AuC in step 3*.
4.4 Design Rationale
The composition of the RAND value in the above scheme has been made as
similar as possible to the 128-bit value AUTN used to provide server-to-UE
authentication in the 3G AKA protocol. This is for two main reasons. Firstly,
as stated above, by adopting this approach it is hoped that implementation
of, and migration to, this new scheme will be made as simple as possible for
network operators. Secondly, the 3G AKA protocol is widely trusted to provide
authentication, and it is hoped that trust in the novel scheme will be maximised
by adopting the same approach.
The only differences between the 3G AUTN and the above construction of
RAND are relatively minor, and are as follows.
– In 3G, the AK value is computed as a function of the the RAND, whereas
here it is necessarily only computed as a function of the last 64 bits of RAND .
However, these last 64 bits are computed as a function of data which changes
for every authentication triple, and hence the AK should still do an effective
job of concealing the content it is used to mask.
– In 3G the AK is only 48 bits long, and is only used to encrypt (mask) the
SQN . Here we use it to mask the SQN and the AMF, to ensure that a ‘new
style’ RAND is indistinguishable from an ‘old style’ randomly generated
RAND to any party without the key Ka.
– In 3G, the MAC is computed as a function of the RAND, SQN and AMF,
whereas in the above scheme it is computed only as a function of SQN and
AMF, again for obvious reasons. This is the only significant difference from
the perspective of authenticating the network to a UE, but we argue below
in section 6.2 that this change does not affect the security of the protocol.
The AUTN checking process proposed here and that used in 3G are essentially
the same.
One other issue that merits mention is the fact that it is proposed that the
SIM outputs random values if authentication fails. It is necessary for the SIM to
output values of some kind, since this is part of the existing SIM-ME protocol.
That is, placeholder values are required. It is important for reasons discussed
below that the SIM should not output the correct session key Kc. The only
other ‘obvious’ placeholder values would be to use fixed strings, but the use of
random values seems less likely to be obvious if these values are sent across the
network (in the case of the SRES value) or used for encryption purposes (for
Kc). There may be advantages in not revealing to a casual eavesdropper the fact
that authentication has failed.
5 Using the Authentication Results
In the previous section we showed how the SIM can authenticate the network;
that is, as a result of step 6*, the SIM will know whether or not the RAND
genuinely originates from the AuC and is fresh. However, we did not describe
any way for the ME to know whether authentication has failed or succeeded
— indeed, the ME will not understand the concept, as we are assuming it is a
‘standard’ GSM device.
Fig. 3. SIM-ME interactions to drop the established connection
We propose that the proactive SIM feature described in section 2.4 be used
to achieve the desired objective. That is, in the event of a network authentica-
tion failure, when sending the SRES and Kc (in this case random) values back
to the ME, the SIM should signal to the phone that it has information to send.
When, as a result, the ME sends the FETCH command to the SIM, the SIM
should respond with the GET CHANNEL STATUS command to learn about
the established channels in the present connection. Upon receiving the channel
information in the TERMINAL RESPONSE command, the SIM uses the re-
sponse status byte in its response to request the ME to send a further FETCH
command. Once it receives the FETCH command, the SIM responds with a
CLOSE CHANNEL command, specifying the channel information it received
from the ME in response to its previous CHANNEL STATUS command. The
interactions between a SIM and an ME are summarised in Fig. 3. The STK
commands issued by the SIM should cause the phone to drop the connection,
and (hopefully) prevent any attempted use of the SRES or key Kc. The values
90 and 91, shown in Fig. 3, represent the value of the status byte sent by the
SIM in response to the previous command, where the value 90 means OK, and
the value 91 instructs the ME to issue a FETCH command to retrieve data from
the SIM. The ‘length’ with the status byte 91 indicates the length of the data
in bytes which the SIM wants to send.
6 Analysis
6.1 Deployment Issues
We next consider certain practical issues that may arise when using the scheme
proposed in section 4.3.
It seems that at least some GSM networks issue authentication triples in
batches (see section 3.3.1.1 of GSM 03.20 [10]), thereby reducing the inter-
network communications overhead. Currently, the order in which GSM authen-
tication triples are used does not matter. However, under the scheme described
above, triples must be used in ascending order of SQN . This may seem prob-
lematic; however, since the requirement to use authentication datasets in the
correct order already applies to the corresponding 5-tuples used in 3G, serving
networks will almost certainly already be equipped to do this.
In existing GSM networks it is possible, although prohibited by the technical
specifications [10], for serving networks to ‘re-use’ authentication triples, i.e. to
send the same RAND value to a UE on multiple occasions. This will no longer
work with the new scheme, since the SIM will detect re-use of a RAND value.
Arguably this is good, since re-use of RAND values is highly insecure: such
behaviour would allow the interceptor of a RAND/SRES pair to impersonate a
valid UE and perhaps steal service at that UE’s expense, an attack that would
be particularly effective in networks not enabling encryption.
Finally note that, in order to fully implement the scheme as described in
section 4, MEs need to support ‘class e’ STK commands, although, as discussed
above, this proportion seems likely to be very high. It is not clear what proportion
of mobile phones in current use support those STK commands.
6.2 Security
We divide our security discussion into three parts: confidentiality and privacy
issues, authentication of network to SIM, and authentication of SIM to network.
Confidentiality and Privacy Issues In ‘standard’ GSM the RAND value is
randomly selected, and so does not reveal anything about the identity of the
phone to which it is sent. In the scheme proposed in section 4.3, the RAND is a
function of a SIM-specific key as well as a potentially SIM-specific SQN value.
However, the SQN is sent encrypted, and, assuming the functions f1 and f5
are well-designed, an interceptor will not be able to distinguish an intercepted
RAND computed according to the new scheme from a random value. Thus the
scheme does not introduce a new threat to identity confidentiality.
The new scheme does not change the way the data confidentiality key Kc is
generated, so the strength of data confidentiality is not affected.
Network-to-SIM Authentication The novel protocol for network-to-SIM
authentication bears strong similarities to the corresponding protocol for 3G.
It also conforms to the one-pass unilateral authentication mechanism specified
in clause 5.1.1 of 9798-4 [15, 17]. All the protocols in this standard have been
formally analysed (and shown to be secure) by Basin, Cremers and Meier [3].
Whilst these arguments do not provide a completely watertight argument for the
protocol’s security, it is clearly a significant improvement over no authentication
at all.
An interesting side observation deriving from the novel scheme is that the 3G
and 4G AKA protocols appear to be overly complex. The randomly generated
RAND value sent from the network to the SIM, which is used to authenticate the
response from the SIM to the network, is actually unnecessary, and the AUTN
value could be used in exactly the same way as the RAND is currently. Whilst
such a change is not possible in practice, it would have avoided the need for the
AuC to generate random values and saved the need to send 16 bytes in the AKA
protocol.
It is interesting to speculate why this design redundancy is present. It seems
possible that the network-to-SIM authentication was added as a completely
separate protocol to complement the GSM-type SIM-to-network authentication
mechanism, and no-one thought how the two mechanisms could be combined
and simplified (as in the mechanism we propose).
SIM-to-Network Authentication The novel scheme does not affect how the
existing SIM-to-network authentication protocol operates, except that a random
RAND is replaced by one which is a cryptographic function of a sequence num-
ber. The new-style RAND remains unpredictable to anyone not equipped with
the key Ka, and is deterministically guaranteed to be non-repeating (a property
that only holds in a probabilistic way for a random RAND). To see why the
RAND is non-repeating, suppose two separate RAND values sent to the same
USIM incorporate the same MAC values (as necessary if they are to be the
same). It follows that the AK values used to mask the SQNs embedded in the
RAND values will also be the same and thus, since the SQN values themselves
will be different, the two RAND values will also differ. That is, it possesses pre-
cisely the qualities required by the existing protocol, and hence the security of
SIM-to-network authentication is unaffected.
6.3 Impact on Known Attacks
We conclude our analysis of the protocol by considering how it affects possible
attacks on GSM networks.
Fake Network Attacks As discussed in section 2.3, if a phone joins a fake
GSM serving network, then this fake network can send any RAND value it likes
as part of the AKA protocol, and the UE will complete the process successfully.
If the network does not enable encryption, then communications between the UE
and the network will work correctly, which could enable the network to act as an
eavesdropping man-in-the-middle by routing calls from the captured UE via a
genuine network. This will no longer be true if the new scheme is implemented,
since the SIM will instruct the ME to drop the connection when supplied with
a non-genuine RAND value.
Of course, it may be possible for a fake network to avoid the AKA protocol
altogether, and simply start communication with a newly attached UE. Whether
MEs will accept unauthenticated communication is currently not clear to the
authors.
Barkan-Biham-Keller Attacks We next consider a particular type of fake
network attack, namely the Barkan-Biham-Keller attack outlined in section 2.3.
As described there, the attack requires the re-sending of an ‘old’ RAND to a UE.
The new scheme will clearly prevent such an attack, i.e. the Barkan-Biham-Keller
attack will be prevented, at least in most practical scenarios.
7 Relationship to the Prior Art
This is by no means the first practical proposal for enhancing GSM to incorporate
mutual authentication. Indeed, the 3G AKA protocol, discussed widely in this
paper, can be regarded as doing exactly that. Although several 3GPP TSG
documents [7, 8] proposed the introduction of network authentication into the
GSM network, none were adopted, presumably because of cost/feasibility issues.
The Ericsson proposal [8] suggested transferring authentication responsibility
to the terminal by implementing the core of the UMTS AKA protocol entirely
in software, which in turn raised other security threats. Other proposals have
been made, including by Kumar et al., [19]. However, all previous proposals
are completely impractical in that they would require replacing all the GSM
infrastructure. Such a major change to an existing very widely deployed scheme
is simply not going to happen.
The most similar proposals to that given here are some of the other schemes
using RAND hijacking, summarised in section 3. In particular, van den Broek,
Verdult and de Ruiter [4] propose a similar structure for a hijacked GSM RAND,
in their case including a sequence number, a new temporary identity for the SIM,
and a MAC, all encrypted in an unspecified way. However, their objective is not
to provide authentication of the network to the SIM, but to provide a way to
reliably transport new identities from the AuC to the SIM.
8 Concluding Remarks
We have proposed a method for enhancing the GSM AKA protocol to provide
authentication of the network to the UE, complementing the UE-to-network
authentication already provided. This provides protection against some of the
most serious threats to the security of GSM networks. This is achieved in a way
which leaves the existing serving network infrastructure unchanged, and also
does not require any changes to existing MEs (mobile phones). That is, unlike
previous proposals of this general type, it is practically realisable.
A number of practical questions remain to be answered, including the pro-
portion of MEs supporting ‘class e’ STK commands, the behaviour of MEs in
networks which never perform the AKA protocol, and whether serving networks
can be relied upon to use GSM authentication triples in the intended order.
Discovering answers to these questions remains as future work.
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